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Abstract  
This paper brings to light the important but insufficiently recognized role played by argumentation in 
financial activities and, more in particular, in corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This role shows 
to be crucial in many phases of the M&A process, in particular in the public offer phase, when corporate 
managers have to convince shareholders of the expediency of the proposed deal but also need to show the 
acceptability of the transaction to a wide public of stakeholders (employees, customers, politicians, 
analysts, investors, regulators, media), involved in the discussions surrounding a deal. The paper intends to 
show how the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 1992a, 
1993) can be applied for reconstructing the argumentative interactions entailed by M&A offers. The 
purpose is to specify the different scenarios within which the discussions are structured and to single out 
the main arguments put forward by the participants in the discussion. This reconstruction shows, on the 
one side, the relevance of argumentation in this type of interaction and constitutes, on the other side, the 
fundamental basis for realizing a consistent evaluation of the argumentative strategies that support (or 
reject) the expediency and acceptability of a proposed transaction. 
 
Keywords: argumentation, confrontation stage, critical discussion, information, mergers and acquisitions. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The importance of information in finance is hard to overestimate. Information in financial markets is 
incomplete because of the uncertainty about future events and asymmetric, as it opposes companies’ 
insiders, owning private information, and the general public of investors, constantly in search of this 
information for managing their investments (Cf.. Barone-Adesi 2002, Leland & Pyle 1977).  
The whole system of financial communication aims at satisfying this high demand for information not 
only by fostering its diffusion into the markets but also by “translating” it and making it more 
comprehensible for those (lay) investors who lack time or skills for acquiring and mastering this 
information, actually indispensable for constructing appropriate reasoning allowing expedient financial 
decisions. Indeed, what makes information extremely relevant for financial decisions is the fact that it 
constitutes the base on which the decision-maker justifies his/her decision. Information constitutes the 
premises for all types of financial reasoning, in particular of those inferential moves that are argumentative 
in nature. In fact, not all types of reasoning are properly argumentative. Argumentation is a social and 
interpersonal activity through which an individual aims at persuading another individual (or a public) to 
accept an opinion (or a proposal) by supporting it with adequate reasons.  
As suggested by Rigotti (2003) human interaction is feasible only through communication. A strong 
argumentative commitment is expected to be the case in those spheres of communication supporting the 
interactions like finance that require a high rate of rationality. Argumentation, being that communication 
discourse which provides reasons in support of a position, is an essential component for the full 
realization of all the interactions in which personal and social opinions, desires, goals, and interests are 
involved. 
In the financial context argumentation is applied in the numerous transactions and negotiations 
characterizing daily business where one party has to convince the other one to settle a deal. Mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) between public companies are a particular case in point, as there two companies 
discuss and negotiate a deal by attempting to persuade each other on the expediency of the reciprocally 
proposed terms. 
Together with bankruptcies, M&As are probably the most interesting and exciting financial events, 
attracting the attention not only of economists, investors and other market participants, but also of media 
and the society in general. From the economic viewpoint, M&As represent significant corporate events: 
they can affect the industrial sector concerned, they bring on important changes in the structure of the 
firms, they involve huge amounts of capital (billions of dollars, indeed!), they have a sensitive impact on 
stock prices. Beside mere financial aspects, social issues too are very often bound to M&As. The after-
merger reorganization might entail lay-offs, resulting in negative reactions by employees and unions. 
Recent cases like Alitalia (Italy) and Societé Generale2 (France) have shown how politicians as well may be 
implicated in a deal, especially when the doom of a company with national importance – like an airline or 
big bank – is at stake. The well-known case of the Vodafone-Mannesmann hostile takeover (February 
                                                            
2 In January 2008, rumors suggested Societé Generale  could have been acquired by another bank. The French government 
explicitly opposed a merger with a foreign bank (The Wall Street Journal Europe, January 30, 2008) 
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2000) is a typical example showing the relevance of extra-financial issues in M&As (Cf. Höpner & Jackson  
2001, 2005; Nowak 2001). This takeover, in fact, generated a long and intense argumentative controversy, 
in which both economic and socio-cultural values were challenged by a large public of stakeholders.  
 
Communicative processes in corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been object of deep 
investigations within the literature in management, corporate strategy and corporate communication 
(Balmer & Dinnie 1999; Bastien 1992, Colombo et al. 2007, Cornett-Devito & Friedman 1995; Demers, 
Giroux, Chreim 2003; Schweiger & Denisi 1991;). These studies focus on the post-merger integration 
phase as a typical issue of corporate communication, considering the efforts made by corporate managers 
for integrating the two merged firms into a new single corporation, with a particular emphasis on the 
communications towards employees. 
There is not an analogously developed literature about the role of communication in other phases of the 
M&A process. Moreover, the argumentative processes are not considered for the crucial phase in which 
corporate managers propose the deal to shareholders through a public offer and argue for the expediency 
of their proposal.  
The present paper represents the first segment of a larger personal research aiming at identifying, analysing 
and evaluating the argumentative strategies performed in the public arena of financial markets in favour 
(or against) a merger offer, in order to establish to what extent the quality of communication and 
argumentation affects the realization of M&A deals.  
This paper will show that M&As involve intense communicative and argumentative interactions that are 
performed through and mirrored by numerous different texts, addressed to the several audiences 
constituting the wide public of stakeholders that the company should consider in order to realize the 
desired transaction. 
 
2. Argumentation in the M&A process 
 
In M&A deals3 two companies, a bidder and a target, are involved. Figure 1 shows the description of an 
ideal M&A process (adapted from Bruner 2004), taking the perspective of the bidder management. 
Initially, bidder managers approach target managers for discussing a possible deal. If the target 
management welcomes the proposal, a joint offer (friendly offer) is made to target shareholders.  
                                                            
3 From a juridical point of view – at least if we consider many regulatory systems such as those of US, EU countries, and 
Switzerland –  there is a clear distinction between statutory merger and stock or asset acquisition (see Gilson & Black 1995). In a 
statutory merger one company is completely absorbed into the other company ceasing to exist as a separate legal entity. In an 
acquisition one company obtains control over another by purchasing some or all its stock or assets (Cf.. Arzac 2005: 143) so 
that both firms could survive. Indeed, what is common in (almost) all these financial operations is that a transfer of control 
takes place from one company (or a group of investors) to the other. For this reason, the term takeover is often adopted as well. 
Ideally, any merger – except the extreme and rare case of Merger of Equals - could be considered as an acquisition or a takeover, 
to the extent that a “winner” could be identified, i.e. between the two merged companies, the one obtaining the larger stake of 
the new company could be considered the acquirer, while the other would be the acquired firm. As Bruner suggests ”the 
[merger/acquisition] distinction is important to lawyers, accountants, and tax specialists, but less so in terms of its economic 
impact. Businesspeople use the terms interchangeably. The acronym “M&A” stands for it all” (2005:1)  
4 
 
 
 
Figure 1: the M&A process 
 
On the opposite, a refusal by the target management can bring either to the end of the negotiations or to 
the launch of a hostile offer, where the bidder management directly addresses target shareholders 
proposing them to accept the bid, while the target management may recommend doing the opposite. That 
is the reason why it is called hostile: not because it damages target shareholders but because it goes against 
the will of target managers or the Board of directors4. The offer is hostile for managers and not, or at least 
not necessarily, for shareholders. A more neutral adjective usually preferred to “hostile” is “unsolicited”, 
which underlines the absence of the management’s consent. In any case, in both friendly and hostile bids, 
                                                            
4 There is not a legal and clear definition of hostile bid. Scholars, business people and media usually use the term hostile when 
either the management or the Board of directors refuses the offer. Actually, it is very difficult to keep totally distinct the opinion 
of the management and the opinion of the Board as executives usually have a seat in the Board and Board members often 
become managers. 
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the final decision is at the solely discretion of shareholders: a deal, in fact, can be settled only after the 
majority of target shareholders has voted in favour of it or has accepted to sell the shares to the bidder5.  
 
We can single out three main argumentative phases in the M&A process (see Table 1). In each of these 
phases specific activity types6 are performed. Rigotti & Rocci (2006) characterize activity type as the 
institutional dimension7 of any communicative interaction, where inter-agents are seen as “role-holders” 
performing specific skills and jobs – interaction schemes – embodied within an interaction field, i.e. within a 
social reality which is fundamental for defining the argumentative interaction as it indicates the inter-
agents’ joint goal – and thus the reason why they enter into a discussion – and their mutual commitments – 
what they are expected to do within the discussion. Table 1 specifies the interaction field involved in each 
phase of the M&A process, as described in Figure 1. 
 
Deal Phase Interaction Field 
1 Deal design and discussion Concerned industrial market 
2 Public offer to shareholders Financial markets 
3 Post-deal integration The after-deal corporate  
            Table 1: Deal phases and interaction fields 
 
The first phase corresponds to the stage where the two companies’ managers discuss the possible deal 
proposed by the bidder. This interaction takes place in private (as indicated, in Figure 1, above the dashed 
line). In the third phase, which occurs only if the deal is settled, the management of the new company 
(NewCo) has the task of implementing the deal by integrating the two old companies and their different 
identities and cultures into a new single corporation.  
The second phase – the one which the present paper deals with - starts when the would-be deal is 
disclosed to the public. Here, the interaction field corresponds to financial markets. In this phase, the main 
goal of managers is to persuade shareholders to accept their offer. The interaction scheme performed is a kind 
of negotiation dialogue (Cf. Walton & Krabbe 1995), in which the joint goal is to find an agreement which 
                                                            
5 If the target company will disappear after the merger, a formal vote by target shareholders is required. Otherwise, shareholders 
have to decide whether to sell their shares or not.  
6 The notion of activity type has been developed by Levinson (1979, 1992), who used it for referring to “a fuzzy category whose 
focal-members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraint on participants, setting and so on, but 
above all on the kinds of allowable contributions”. 
7 The other dimension is the interpersonal one (Cf.. Muller & Perret-Clermont 1999), where it is acknowledged that inter-agents 
are individuals, belonging to a community and with personal goals that might go far beyond the institutional goal they have 
within the interaction. Thus, a conflict might arise between individual and institutional goals: it is the typical principal-agent 
problem (Ross 1972, Jensen 1976, Eisenhardt 1989), where the agent is tempted to pursue his/her own interests instead of 
those of the principal, imposed by the contract defining their relationship. 
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satisfies both parties: managers communicate with shareholders for settling the deal. Beside the need to 
convince their counterparty in the negotiation, managers also have to “legitimate” their proposal in front 
of the investment community and in front of specific members of the social community,  involved in -  or 
affected by – the would-be deal (see next section). Indeed, managers’ central goal appears here to be the 
same: to successfully finalise the transaction.  
This strong differentiation of publics corresponding to the different stakeholders involved in the deal 
induce companies to produce many different documents – press releases, merger prospectuses, circulars 
and letters, advertisements -  and to organize communicative events – analysts/investors conference calls, 
press conferences, public presentations. The form and content of all these communication activities is 
subject to precise requirements imposed by the supervising authorities (SEC in US, SFBC in Switzerland). 
In the context of financial markets, in fact, public companies have to comply with many disclosure rules 
for the sake of investors and savers8 and, more in general, for guaranteeing a transparent, reliable and 
efficient market. 
Furthermore, these documents and events represent the activity itself of negotiating and conducting the 
transaction. These documents and events constitute that set of data to which my argumentative analysis is 
devoted. 
 
3. Defining argumentative interactions in different scenarios of M&A offers 
 
3.1. The pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion 
I wish now to synthetically outline the model of critical discussion I adopt in my analysis. The Pragma-
dialectical theory, founded by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984), aims at reconciling 
descriptive and critical approaches to argumentation9 by critically analyzing real argumentative discourses that 
take place in the various social contexts (law, media, business, politics, health care and so on) through a 
normative standard, represented by the ideal model of critical discussion. In a critical discussion (CD), two 
parties – a protagonist and an antagonist – try to resolve a difference of opinion along four ideal stages: 
confrontation stage, where the difference of opinions (standpoints) is made explicit; opening stage, where the 
common ground is established: the parties agree on the rules for discussion and, above all, the shared 
information on which the arguments are constructed is defined10; argumentation stage, where reasons are 
                                                            
8 Barone-Adesi (2002) rightly observes that public companies face a conflict between the need to inform investors for raising 
capital and the need to keep information private for being competitive and create value. 
9 The difference between descriptive and critical approaches is defined by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs 
(1993: vii) as follows: “In contemporary argumentation research, there is an unfortunate division between descriptive and 
critical work. Those approaching argumentation theory from a social scientific perspective tend to think their work as 
“descriptive”, and those approaching argumentation theory from humanistic perspectives such as logic and rhetoric tend to 
think of their work as “normative” or “critical”. Social scientific approaches generally claim to be value-free. They generally 
portray themselves as avoiding questions of how individuals in principles should and should not argue. In contrast, critical 
approaches are often more concerned with the properties of models on ideal argumentation than with features of actual 
argumentative practice. They tend to emphasize questions of how, ideally, individuals should and should not argue, seeming to be 
generally uninterested in questions of how individuals in fact do and do not argue”. 
10 Argumentation can work only if a certain common ground exists between the co-arguers. Argumentation, in fact, consists in 
bringing the other to recognize something he/she initially doubts or opposes starting from what he/she already accepts and 
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given for supporting the one’s own standpoint and attacking the other’s standpoint; concluding stage, where 
parties draw conclusions about the result of their discussion. 
Since its foundation, this model has been applied in many social contexts and practices, in particular: legal 
argumentation (Feteris 1999), problem-solving (Van Rees 2001, 2003), health care (Rubinelli & Schulz 
2006, 2007), mediation (Greco-Morasso 2008). 
In the confrontation stage parties can advance three kinds of standpoint about a problematic proposition 
(issue): a positive standpoint affirming the proposition; a negative standpoint negating the proposition; a 
neutral standpoint expressing a doubt about the proposition. For example, if the problematic proposition 
is whether insider trading should be punished, a positive standpoint would sound as “insider trading 
should be punished”, a negative standpoint “insider trading should not be punished”, a neutral standpoint 
“I do not know (or I am not sure, I frankly doubt, etc…) whether insider trading should be punished or 
not”. Starting from this scenario, the analyst can establish the type of dispute and assign the role that 
parties take within the discussion. When the difference of opinion concerns only one proposition we have 
a single dispute. When two or more propositions are at stake the dispute is called multiple. Another basic 
distinction is between non-mixed and mixed dispute. The former consists of one party, being the 
protagonist, who advances a positive or negative standpoint, and the other party, being the antagonist, 
who reacts by simply expressing a doubt, i.e. with a neutral standpoint. In a mixed dispute one party is 
protagonist of a positive standpoint, while the other party is protagonist of a negative standpoint. It is very 
important to clearly establish whether a party is protagonist or antagonist as to be protagonist entails 
carrying the burden of proof: according to Pragma-Dialectics, whoever advances a positive or negative 
standpoint is committed to justify it with proper arguments11. The same does not hold for the antagonist, 
who, by expressing a doubt, is simply inviting the protagonist to justify his/her opinion.  
As a result, four fundamental types of dispute, summarized in Table 2, can arise: single non-mixed, single 
mixed, multiple non-mixed, multiple mixed.  
 
  
Non-mixed 
 
Mixed 
 
Single 
 
Single non-mixed 
X: Insider trading should (not) be punished 
Y: why (not)? 
 
Single mixed 
X: Insider trading should not be punished 
Y: Insider trading should be punished 
 
 
Multiple 
 
Multiple non-mixed 
X: Insider trading should (not) be forbidden, 
and insider traders should (not) be put in jail 
Y: why (not)? 
 
 
Multiple mixed 
X: Insider trading should be forbidden, and 
insider traders should be put in jail 
Y: Insider trading should not be forbidden, and 
insider traders should not be put in jail 
Table 2: types of dispute 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
showing a connection between the already accepted premises (endoxa) and the deriving conclusion, which is the standpoint (Cf. 
Rigotti 2006). 
11 Cf. Rule 2 of CD (burden-of-proof rule): “a party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if the other party asks him 
to do so” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 208). 
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Let us apply this theoretical framework on the subject of the present paper, i.e. M&A proposals. When a 
M&A offer is launched, a difference of opinion arises between managers and shareholders that can be 
reconstructed within the model of CD in terms of confrontation stage. By proposing to accept the offer, the 
bidder “invites” shareholders to tender their shares and, at the same time, takes the commitment of paying 
shareholders if they would tender.  
In this perspective, it is very important to take into account the means of payment, i.e. whether the offer is 
in cash or it consists of an exchange of stock, because of the different entailments for target shareholders. 
On the one side, a cash deal entails target shareholders to cease to be shareholders: ownership is exchanged 
for liquidity. On the other side, in a stock-for-stock deal target shareholders hold stakes in the NewCo, 
thus directly participating to future gains (or losses). Therefore, in a stock offer managers are committed to 
show to target shareholders that the after-deal company will perform well, that the value of target shares 
will be higher with the deal than if the target firm would remain alone; in a cash offer there is no point in 
showing this. Target shareholders would receive neither benefits nor losses from the NewCo. What 
matters for target shareholders is that the value of the offer (the Euro/franc/dollar price) is higher than the 
value of the target shares if the target firm remains alone. 
In the following two sub-sections it is shown how the confrontation stage that arises from M&A 
proposals can be reconstructed, distinguishing in particular between friendly offers (3.2.1) and hostile 
offers (3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1. Friendly offers 
Friendly offers occur when the two companies’ managements find an agreement after private negotiations 
(See Figure 1, right side). The deal is jointly proposed to target shareholders and recommended by target 
executives and Board of directors. Various documents are deployed here. Shareholders should receive a 
merger prospectus including all the necessary information about the transaction. Also, companies issue 
press releases in order to announce the agreement and send letters to shareholders, in which they 
recommend to accept the deal, as the following example shows: 
 
“It was announced today that Cornwall Bidco and the Independent Directors [of Civica plc] had reached 
agreement on the terms of a recommended cash offer to be made by Cornwall Bidco to acquire the entire 
issued and to be issued ordinary share capital of Civica. […] The Offer represents an opportunity for 
Shareholders to realize their entire investment in Civica at an attractive cash price at a time of economic and 
stock market uncertainty […] The Independent Directors consider that the Offer is in the best interests of 
Shareholders as a whole. Accordingly, the Independent Directors unanimously recommend that Shareholders 
accept the Offer […]” (Civica plc, Letter of recommendation from the Chairman of Civica, 28 March 2008) 
 
We can assign to the two companies’ managements the role of co-protagonist defending the positive 
standpoint that the deal would be expedient for (“in the best interests of”) shareholders; and to target 
shareholders the role of antagonist assuming that they only express a doubt, in the sense that they request 
reasons justifying the positive recommendation towards the proposal. We can remark, in the reported 
passage, the presence of a precise argument supporting the proposal:  
9 
 
 “the Offer represents an opportunity for Shareholders to realize their entire investment in Civica 
at an attractive cash price at a time of economic and stock market uncertainty”.  
 
This difference of opinion results in a non-mixed CD, as indicated in Figure 2 by the single arrow12. (It 
may also be the case that target shareholders expressively oppose the would-be merger. I will consider this 
eventuality later when the role of bidder shareholders is also discussed). 
 
 
Figure 2: friendly offer to target shareholders: confrontation stage 
 
There might be cases where the target management neither expresses a positive nor a negative standpoint, 
especially when more than one offer is made to target shareholders: 
 
“The ABN AMRO Managing Board and the ABN AMRO Supervisory Board remain committed to ensuring 
that shareholders have the option to accept either the Consortium Offer or the Barclays Offer. The 
combination with Barclays remains consistent with the strategic intent of ABN AMRO as an institution. 
Furthermore, the ABN AMRO Boards are not in a position to support the break-up of ABN AMRO but 
acknowledge that the Consortium Offer, with its high cash component and significant implied premium to 
the Barclays Offer, is clearly superior for the ABN AMRO shareholders from a financial point of view based 
on current valuation levels. 
Therefore, the ABN AMRO Managing Board and the ABN AMRO Supervisory Board refrain from 
recommending either Offer for acceptance to ABN AMRO shareholders.” (Abn Amro, Shareholders’ circular, 
p.30, 16 Sept. 2007). 
 
We can see that, even though a precise opinion is not put forward, there is a commitment by ABN AMRO 
managers in argumentatively justifying their position. They confirm the expediency of Barclay’s offer as: 
 it “remains consistent with the strategic intent of ABN AMRO as an institution”,  
 “they are not in the position to support the break-up of ABN AMRO” implied by the alternative 
offer; 
while  they acknowledge the superiority of the Consortium’s offer because of: 
 “its high cash component”  
                                                            
12 MB= bidder management; MT= target management; SB= bidder shareholders; ST= target shareholders. 
ST 
MB +(MT) 
“To accept the offer 
is expedient”
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  its “significant implied premium to the Barclays offer” 
 
What about bidder shareholders? Are they completely excluded from the final decision even though the 
value of their stock could be highly affected by the transaction? Indeed, only in statutory mergers a vote by 
them is needed, as it was the case with Banca Intesa and San Paolo IMI. The two Italian banks merged and 
formed Intesa SanPaolo in 2006, after both Intesa shareholders and San Paolo shareholders had separately 
voted in favour of the combination. Figure 3 below reproduces the confrontation stage. A similar situation 
took place in the case of ABN AMRO, quoted in the previous example. Before considering the offer 
launched by the RBS-led Consortium (which finally won) an agreement with Barclays was settled and 
disclosed: 
 
“The Managing Board and Supervisory Board of ABN AMRO Holding N.V. ("ABN AMRO") and the Board 
of Directors of Barclays PLC ("Barclays") jointly announce that agreement has been reached on the 
combination of ABN AMRO and Barclays. Each of the Boards has unanimously resolved to recommend the 
transaction to its respective shareholders. The holding company of the combined group will be called 
Barclays PLC”. (Abn Amro and Barclays,  Abn Amro and Barclays announce agreement on terms of merger, joint press 
release, p.1, 23 April 2007). 
 
 
Figure 3: Statutory merger (friendly): Confrontation stage 
 
As a matter of fact bidder managers often exploit the mechanism of triangular merger13 to avoid the 
shareholders’ vote. Alternatively, Treasury stock14 can also be used, at least for small acquisitions. In any 
case a vote by shareholders is required when the bidder needs to issue new shares for financing the deal 
(unless the management previously obtained a proxy for increasing capital). Not by chance, as Myers and 
Majluf (1984) suggest, managers deciding how to finance an investment follow a pecking order : first they use 
                                                            
13 In triangular mergers, the bidder creates a wholly owned subsidiary (SubCo) that will merge with the target company. When 
the target merges into the SubCo we properly speak of a forward triangular merger; while when the SubCo merges into the target, 
the transaction is called reverse triangular merger. In both cases, the final result is that the bidder company takes control over the 
target. 
14 Treasury stock are shares bought back by the issuing company but not cancelled from the balance sheet, and as such available 
for resale. 
ST 
MT MB  
SB 
“To accept the offer  
is expedient” 
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internal funds (cash or Treasury stock); then, if they need to raise new funds, debt is preferred to stock. 
Obviously, the absence of a shareholders’ vote does not mean their opinion is not influential: bidder 
managers are always expected to act in shareholders’ best interests. In this perspective, M&As are nothing 
but investments made by the firm and, as such, they can be accepted, from an economic viewpoint, only if 
they maximise shareholders wealth. The risk for the bidder management in not adequately taking into 
account their own shareholders is that a group of “dissidents” might strongly oppose the deal and make an 
attempt to convince the other shareholders not to approve the deal, even engaging in a proxy fight15. In 
general, such initiatives are taken by activist shareholders, i.e. institutional investors like hedge, mutual and 
pension funds having the financial and informational strength for challenging the management. Activists 
in M&As can be shareholders in the bidder firm, in the target or in both of them. A significant real 
example is the Deutsche Börse (DB) - London Stock Exchange (LSE) case. In 2005 DB was in talk with 
LSE for a merger after a previous attempt in 2001 failed. The Children Investment Fund (TCI), a DB 
institutional shareholder, strongly opposed the proposal and finally succeeded in preventing the settlement 
of the deal:  
 
“Deutsche Börse AG announced on Saturday that it has received a request from TCI Fund Management 
(UK) LLP (TCI) to call an extraordinary general meeting (EGM).[…]. TCI alleges that the price of 530 pence 
per share proposed by Deutsche Börse for the acquisition of the London Stock Exchange plc (London Stock 
Exchange) exceeds the potential benefits of this acquisition. TCI wishes that the shareholders meeting instead 
discusses a purchase by Deutsche Börse of its own shares. Deutsche Börse is convinced that its contemplated 
cash acquisition of the London Stock Exchange is in the best interests of its shareholders and the company.” 
(DB, Deutsche Börse has received a request for an extraordinary general meeting, ad hoc announcement, 15 Jan. 2005). 
 
We can observe from this announcement that TCI is not simply antagonist of the standpoint that the deal 
with LSE is in the best interests of DB shareholders. They believe that the deal is not expedient and 
propose rather a share repurchase. The resulting dispute is thus mixed (with TCI being the protagonist of 
a negative standpoint) and multiple as two different propositions are under discussion (the expediency of 
the LSE deal and the expediency of the share repurchase). Multiple non-mixed discussions take place also 
between bidder managers and (non dissident) bidder shareholders on the one side, and between dissident 
and non dissident bidder shareholders on the other side (See Figure 4 above). In the reported 
announcement we recognize the presence of an argument advanced by TCI against the deal stating that 
the price offered by DB for LSE: 
 “exceeds the potential benefits of this acquisition”.  
For par condicio I also wish to report an argument given by DB board in support of the expediency of the 
acquisition:  
                                                            
15 Dissident shareholders openly express their opposition to the deal and try to convince the other shareholders to reject it. 
Usually, when this occurs, the dissident group either makes a tender offer to the remaining shareholders, becoming so a 
competitive bidder, or starts a proxy contest (or proxy fights), which take place when the dissident group asks to the other 
shareholders a proxy for representing them (i.e. voting on behalf of them) at the extraordinary assembly, where shareholders 
have to vote on the proposed deal.  
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 “The Executive Board estimates that a combination with the London Stock Exchange would lead 
to an additional contribution to profit before tax from revenue and cost synergies of at least EUR 
100 million per annum which is expected to be achieved in the third financial year (2008) following 
completion of the transaction”. (DB, Proposed Pre-Conditional Cash Offer by Deutsche Börse for the LSE, ad hoc 
announcement, 27 Jan. 2005) 
 
Figure 4: Dissident shareholders in the bidder company: confrontation stage (DB example) 
 
3.2.2. Hostile offers 
Hostile bids are launched against target management’s approval. While the bidder management invites 
target shareholders to accept the offer, the target management recommends them to reject it. In 2006 
NASDAQ made a hostile offer to LSE. As it is often the case in analogous situations, both companies 
released circulars to target shareholders. The cover page of two circulars are reported in Figure 5 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: NASDAQ Vs. LSE 
SB 
SB(activist)  
MB 
A 
¬B 
A= the LSE deal is expedient 
B= a stock repurchase is expedient 
A
¬B
B
¬A
B
¬A
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The first one was posted by LSE, the other by NASDAQ. Two opposite standpoints are clearly stated: 
“Accept NASDAQ’s offer now” is the positive standpoint advanced by NASDAQ, while “Reject - i.e. “do 
not accept”- NASDAQ’s offer” is the negative standpoint advanced by LSE. 
The two standpoints are supported by numerous arguments developed in the two circulars. Among the 
numerous reasons, LSE recommended to reject NASDAQ’s proposal as it: 
 
 “does not give LSE shareholders standalone value 
 does not reflect the Exchange’s unique strategic position 
 does not pay a premium for control” (LSE, Reject Nasdaq’s offer, released document, 19 Dec. 2006) 
 
while NASDAQ defended its opinion with arguments like: 
 
 “Standalone value is recognized by the offer 
 LSE fails to acknowledge new competitive threats 
 The combination will reinforce the competitive position of London” (NASDAQ, Accept 
NASDAQ’s offer now, released document, 9 Jan. 2007) 
 
As in the previous case, two non-mixed discussions take place: the bidder management invites target 
shareholders to accept the offer, while target management aims at convincing shareholders not to accept 
the offer. At the same time, a mixed dispute can be identified between the two companies’ managements. 
We could ask whether such dispute also involves a real discussion. In other words: are the managements 
attempting to persuade each other or, more simply, they have two opposite standpoints in front of the 
same decision-maker? Usually the latter is the case. It is a situation very similar to what Aristotle used to 
call deliberative rhetoric, in which each party (bidder management and target management in our case) aims at 
convincing an audience (target shareholders) on the expediency of an action to be taken in the future 
(selling or keeping  shares) by justifying their own position and destroying the counterparty’s arguments in 
front of the decision maker.  
 
Figure 6: hostile offers: confrontation stage 
 
MB MT 
ST 
¬A
¬A
A
A 
A= the offer is expedient 
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Sometimes, however, a proper mixed discussion takes place between managers, in particular when it seems 
that there could still be a space for a friendly agreement, as between Yahoo! Board and Microsoft CEO 
Steve Balmer16: 
 
Dear Steve,  
[…] Our Board carefully considered your unsolicited proposal, unanimously concluded that it was not in the best 
interests of Yahoo! and our stockholders, and rejected it publicly on February 11, 2008. […] At the same time, we 
have continued to make clear that we are not opposed to a transaction with Microsoft if it is in the best interests 
of our stockholders. […] Contrary to statements in your letter, stockholders representing a significant portion of 
our outstanding shares have indicated to us that your proposal substantially undervalues Yahoo! […] In 
conclusion, please allow us to restate our position, so there can be no confusion. We are open to all alternatives 
that maximize stockholder value. To be clear, this includes a transaction with Microsoft […]. (Yahoo! Yahoo!'s 
Board of Directors Responds to Latest Microsoft Letter, Press Release, 7 April 2008). 
 
3.3. Stakeholders, media and analysts 
 
It took months for Delta Air Lines Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corp. to agree on a merger plan to create the 
world's largest airline in terms of traffic. Now the two carriers face the tough task of convincing politicians, 
pilots' unions and antitrust regulators that it's a good idea. (The Wall Street Journal Europe, Airline Deal Isn’t 
Done Yet, 16 April 2008). 
 
The prologue of this WSJ article clearly shows the necessity for companies not to consider managers and 
shareholders only but also other stakeholders involved. As previously said, M&As have a “social” 
relevance beside a purely financial one, that includes a series of stakeholders, others than shareholders, 
being in the position of (more or less strongly) influencing the outcome of a public offer or the long-term 
performance of the post-merger firm. 
Beside regulators, which may forbid an already agreed deal because potentially dangerous for the market 
competitiveness, there are some classes of stakeholders which cannot directly decide on the deal but can 
strongly influence its successfulness or failure. Employees (and unions) are concerned with the possible 
negative consequences a deal could have on them (job losses or worsening of job conditions); very often 
politicians intervene by supporting or hindering a deal because of social or national concerns. The recent 
case of Alitalia and Airfrance is only one of the numerous examples showing the relevance of politics in 
M&A, especially in cross-border takeovers.  
                                                            
16 It is noteworthy to observe the genre to which this communication belongs. On the one hand, it is a letter addressed to an 
individual person, Steve Balmer, and as such it presents the characteristics typically belonging to interpersonal communication. 
On the other hand, this letter is publicly disclosed as a press release, the latter being a typical means of mass communication. 
This fact affects the interpretation of the communicative intention of the text, which does not only correspond to persuading 
the bidder’s manager on the inexpediency of the offer but indirectly aims also to join other audiences (Yahoo! shareholders in 
particular). 
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Furthermore, in M&As a relevant and influential role is played by financial analysts who express opinions 
and evaluations that may serve as a starting point for the shareholders’ final decision. Such expert opinions 
are often reported and re-elaborated by media (Cf. Rocci & Palmieri 2007). Not by chance, when M&A 
proposals are disclosed, press conferences and analysts conference calls are organized in order to present 
and justify the benefits of the deal to journalists and analysts respectively. The main goal of these dialogic 
interactions is to obtain positive evaluations on the deal. Unless they are also shareholders (as sometimes is 
the case), reporters and analysts play the fundamental role of assessors. 
The following table sums up the above considerations by assuming the perspective of the bidder managers 
which, in order to successfully settle the deal, should consider the various types of addressee listed in the 
first column. For any addressee, argumentation is needed in order to pursue specific goals, indicated in the 
second column. The third column lists the most important communicative activities and documents 
through which these argumentative discussions are performed. 
 
Addressee Argumentation for… Argumentation through…
Target 
shareholders 
Settling the deal Press releases, merger prospectus, circular, 
ads, investor presentations 
Target 
management 
Facilitating the settlement of the deal Private meetings, letters, press releases. 
Bidder 
shareholders 
Settling the deal or being supported in the business Press releases, merger prospectus, circulars, 
ads, investor presentations 
Workers 
and unions 
Creating a favorable impression in the target 
community and preventing future internal conflicts
Press releases, letters, circulars, ads, formal 
meetings 
Supervisory 
authorities 
Obtaining clearance 
Ensuring transparency 
Merger prospectus and other official 
documents 
Analysts 
and media 
Obtaining positive evaluations Conference calls, press conferences
Table 3: The bidder management’s argumentation with actual and potential addressees  
 
 
4. Conclusive remarks and further steps of research 
 
This paper presents a first investigation on the proper role of argumentation in financial activities. M&As 
represent indeed a good example showing the relevance of argumentative processes for the negotiation of 
financial transactions. Argumentation intervenes throughout the several corporate communication events 
that are performed in specific textual documents. Actually, these documents are the tools for conducting 
and realizing the transaction through which managers attempt to show the financial and also the social 
expediency of a M&A deal to a very heterogeneous audience. Of course, the main goal of managers is to 
convince shareholders to accept the merger offer, but the public of stakeholders (employees, unions, 
politicians, analysts and investors), who might influence the shareholders’ final decisions or the future 
business of the company, should be considered too. The role played by all these stakeholders must be 
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studied more in depth in further research, especially because it certainly has strong implications on the 
construction of the argumentative strategies by corporate managers.  
This article has mainly focused on the reconstruction of the  confrontation stage of the critical discussion 
and has only given a taste of the arguments advanced in the discussion. Thus, the next step of this research 
project consists of identifying, analyzing and evaluating all the arguments supporting the different 
standpoints put forward. The analysis will consider arguments in their dialectical and rhetorical 
components (Cf. Van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002; Rigotti 2006) and intends to answer some important 
research questions, like: 
 Are there typical recurrent argumentative strategies deployed by managers? 
 Is the choice of arguments affected by the type of deal involved (hostile or friendly; national or 
cross-border; horizontal or vertical; strategic or financial)? 
 How and to what extent does argumentation contribute to the realization of the financial 
transaction? 
 Does the settlement of the deal always correspond to a reasonable resolution of the difference of 
opinion?  
 Is there a relation between the quality of argumentation and the successfulness of a transaction 
(both in terms of deal settlement and financial performance)? 
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